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From May to October each year, the corn 
market typically finds direction from the 
prospective size of the U.S. corn crop.   
Expectation about crop size starts with the 
USDA’s March Prospective Plantings report, 
changes with the USDA weekly reports of 
planting progress and crop conditions and 
the June Acreage report, and culminates 
with the USDA monthly production forecasts 
beginning in August.  Corn prices are 
especially sensitive to the prospective size 
of the U.S. crop in years when stocks are 
relatively low and/or in years of robust 
demand for corn.  During those periods, a 
substantial shortfall in production would be 
very disruptive to the corn market, require 
significant adjustments by end users, and 
have the potential to increase food prices.  
Instances of substantial shortfalls in the size 
of the U.S. crop when stocks were low and 
demand was strong have been rare (1974 
and 1995), but years with the potential for 
such an occurrence have been more 
numerous.  The current year is one of those 
years.  Market participants are highly 
sensitive to prospective crop size and corn 
prices have been quite volatile early in the 
2007 production cycle.  It may be very 
helpful, then, to provide an early 
assessment of potential U. S. corn 
production in 2007 and the likely impact on 
corn prices and the implications for market 






The current U.S. corn market is generally 
characterized by four factors: 1) rapidly 
expanding consumption due primarily to 
increasing quantities of corn used for 
ethanol production, 2) declining inventories, 
3) high prices, and 4) reported intentions to 
increase planted acreage.   
       
The USDA estimates that corn used for 
ethanol production totaled 1.323 billion 
bushels in the 2004-05 marketing year and 
1.603 billion bushels in the 2005-06 
marketing year.  Use is projected at 2.15 
billion bushels during the current marketing 
year.  The Renewable Fuels Association 
reported that as of May 8, 2007, 118 bio-
refineries were in operation with annual 
production capacity of 6.1 billion gallons of 
ethanol.  In addition, eight existing plants 
were expanding capacity and 79 plants 
were under construction.  Those additions 
were estimated to have annual production 
capacity of 6.4 billion gallons.  The USDA’s 
World Agricultural Outlook Board (WAOB) 
forecasts that 3.4 billion bushels of corn will 
be used for ethanol production in the 2007-
08 marketing year.  In the very near future, 
annual ethanol production capacity will 
exceed 12.5 billion gallons.  If corn remains 
the predominant feed stock for ethanol 
production, nearly 4.5 billion bushels could 
be used annually (assuming a conversion 
ratio of 2.8 gallons of ethanol per bushel of 
corn) beginning late in the 2007-08 or early 
in the 2008-09 marketing year. 
   2
Year-ending stocks of U.S. corn reached a 
17-year high of 2.114 billion bushels on 
September 1, 2005, but stocks were at 
1.967 billion bushels on September 1, 2006, 
and the USDA projects stocks on 
September 1, 2007 to be only 937 million 
bushels.  Consumption during the 2006-07 
marketing year is expected to be a record 
11.575 billion bushels, 1.04 billion more 
than produced in 2006.  As a result of 
prospects of declining inventories and the 
need for U.S. producers to plant more corn 
in 2007, corn prices moved sharply higher 
beginning in September 2006.  July 2007 
corn futures increased from about $2.70 in 
September 2006 to a high of $4.60 in 
February 2007.  U.S. producers responded 
to the high prices, reporting intentions to 
plant 90.454 million acres of corn in 2007, 
12.1 million more than planted in 2006.   
Prices moved lower following the report of 
those intentions, but December 2007 
futures remained near $3.70 in mid-May, at 
the extreme high end of the historical range 
of prices for this time of year. 
  
If all of the intended corn acreage is 
planted, acreage not harvested for grain is 
near a normal level, and the U.S. average 
yield is near a trend value, the 2007 corn 
crop would be near 12.29 billion bushels. 
Such a crop would be 16.7 percent larger 
than the 2006 crop and 4.1 percent larger 
than the record crop of 2004.  Even such a 
large crop, however, would not be large 
enough to accommodate the current level of 
domestic feed use (5.85 billion bushels), 
exports (2.2 billion bushels), processing 
uses (3.525 billion bushels), and an 
expected 1.25 billion bushel increase in 
ethanol use of corn during the 2007-08 
marketing year.  With slow planting 
progress early in the season, there was 
some concern that not all of the intended 
acreage would get planted and/or the U.S. 
average yield could be below trend in 2007.  
However, planting was progressing at a 
normal pace by May 13.  Any substantial 
shortfall in production would not only result 
in a further reduction in domestic 
inventories, but could require some 
reduction in the anticipated level of 
consumption.  Prices would have to be high 
enough to force such a reduction.  The 
concern is that supplies could be small 
enough to require large reductions in use, 
very high corn prices, and escalating food 
prices.  At the extreme, shortfalls could be 
large enough to bring government 
intervention into the allocation process.   
 
ESTIMATING PRODUCTION RISK  
 
Production risk is defined here as the 
potential difference between actual 
production and expected production.  The 
methodology used here to quantify that risk 
is to calculate the probability distribution of 
the historical differences between actual 
production and expected production in the 
spring of the year.  The period 1970 through 
2006 is used to calculate that historical 
distribution of the differences.  Actual 
production is the USDA estimate of crop 
size in the January Crop Production report 
released following harvest.  For the 
purposes of this analysis, expected 
production in the spring of the year is 
calculated in a three step process.  First, 
expected planted acreage is the acreage 
intended to be planted as reported by the 
USDA in the March Prospective Plantings 
report.  Second, expected harvested 
acreage for grain is calculated as acreage 
intended to be planted minus the 5-year 
moving average difference between actual 
planted acreage and acreage harvested for 
grain.  Third, expected harvested acreage is 
multiplied by the U.S. average trend yield.  
The trend yield is calculated as the linear 
trend of actual yields from 1960 through the 
year previous to the current year.  For 
example, the trend yield for 1970 is 
calculated from actual average yields from 
1960 through 1969.  For 1971, the trend is 
calculated from actual yields from 1960 
through 1970, and so on.   
 
Some might argue that a higher trend yield 
estimate should be used for more recent 
years since yields have increased at a 
faster rate since 1996.  The argument is that   3
increases in the U.S. average yield has 
been accelerated by more rapid 
development and adoption of new 
technology, particularly in the form of 
improved seed genetics.  However, careful 
examination of state average yield data for 
Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa since 1996 
suggests that the increasing trend value has 
resulted from generally more favorable 
growing season weather conditions in the 
Corn Belt rather than an increased rate of 
technology development or adoption.   
Technology may currently be developing 
and adopted at a faster rate than in the past 
and could eventually result in an 
accelerated trend increase in corn yields, 
but the effects were not yet observed 
through 2006.  For now, the long-term linear 
trend is likely still the best forecast of 
expected yield prior to the growing season 
and is used in this analysis. 
 
An alternative methodology for determining 
expected production is to simply use the 
WAOB production forecast made in May of 
each year.  While the WAOB procedure for 
calculating the May forecast (expected 
production) has changed some over time, 
the general procedure is similar to that used 
here.  The WAOB production forecast is 
based on planting intentions, an expectation 
for harvested acreage based on the 
historical relationship between planted and 
harvested acreage, and an expected yield 
based on trend.  That forecast has been 
made each year since 1975.  The 
differences between actual and expected 
production from 1975 through 2006 using 
the WAOB forecast are highly correlated 
(+0.96) to the differences using the 
methodology in this paper.  The distribution 
of differences between actual and expected 
production, in 10 percent increments, is also 
very similar for the two methodologies.  The 
advantages of using the methodology 
outlined for this paper are: 1) the calculation 
of expected production can be made 
sooner, with the release of the Prospective 
Plantings report, and 2) the methodology 
has had a smaller forecast error than the 
WAOB methodology. 
The calculation of annual differences 
between actual and expected U.S. corn 
production from 1970 through 2006 is 
shown in the data appendix and a plot of the 
differences over time is presented in Figure 
1.  The frequency distribution of those 
differences, in increments of 10 percentage 
points, is depicted in Figure 2.  Since 1970 
(37 years), actual U.S. corn production 
relative to expected production in the spring 
has been as follows: 
                
10 to 20 percent larger----5 years-----13.5% 
  0 to 10 percent larger--17 years- ----45.9% 
  0 to 10 percent smaller-- 8 years-----21.6% 
10 to 20 percent smaller-- 3 years-------8.1% 
20 to 30 percent smaller---1 year--------2.7% 
30 to 40 percent smaller---1 year--------2.7% 
More than 40 percent smaller-2 years--5.4%
 
 Actual production was larger than expected 
production in 22 years and smaller in 15 
years.  Actual production was within 10 
percent of expected production in 25 of the 
37 years (67.5 percent).  The distribution of 
the differences, however, is skewed to the 
left, meaning that there were more extreme 
shortfalls in production than there were 
extreme positive differences in actual and 
expected production.  The annual 
percentage differences between actual and 
expected production, ordered from low to 
high, are shown in Table 1.  Production was 
more than 40 percent below expected 
production in 1974 and in 1988.  The largest 
positive difference, 16.7 percent, was in 
1979. 
 
On average, most of the historical difference 
between actual and expected production 
was due to the difference between actual 
and expected (trend) yield rather than the 
difference between actual and expected 
harvested acreage.  The relationship 
between the difference in expected 
production and the difference in expected 
yield is shown in Figures 3.  While there 
were a few exceptions, the two differences 
have been highly correlated.  As a result, 
probability distributions are similar for the   4
two differences and the current analysis 
could be conducted with either.  We have 
used the distribution of production 




DISTRIBUTION FOR 2007 
 
For 2007, expected U.S. corn production is 
calculated as: 
 
(90.454 million acres planted minus 7.772 
million acres not harvested for grain) X                                                                                       
148.6 bushels per acre = 12.29 billion 
bushels. 
 
This calculation is smaller than the expected 
production forecast of 12.465 billion bushels 
used by the USDA’s World Agricultural 
Outlook Board in the May 11, 2007 issue of 
World Agricultural Supply and Demand 
Estimates.  That forecast used a trend yield 
calculation of 150.3 bushels, slightly higher 
than the trend calculation used here. 
 
Using 12.29 billion bushels as the expected 
production in 2007, a 10 percent difference 
from actual production is 1.229 billion 
bushels.  Actual crop size in increments of 
10 percent difference from expected 
production would be: 
 
+20 percent = 14.75 billion bushels
+10 percent = 13.52 billion bushels
 -10 percent = 11.06 billion bushels
 -20 percent =   9.83 billion bushels
 -30 percent =   8.60 billion bushels
 -40 percent =   7.37 billion bushels
 
Since the largest positive difference 
between actual and expected production 
has been 16.7 percent, 14.34 billion bushels 
is used as the upper end of the production 
distribution for 2007.  Similarly, since the 
largest negative difference between actual 
and expected production has been 40.5 
percent, 7.36 billion bushels is used as the 
lower end of the production distribution. 
 
The probability distribution of expected 
production for 2007, then, based strictly on 
the historical differences between actual 
and expected production is as follows:  
 
          13.52 to 14.34 billion----13.5% 
          12.29 to 13.52 billion—-45.9% 
          11.06 to 12.29 billion-----21.6%           
            9.83 to 11.06 billion-----8.1% 
            8.60 to 9.83 billion-------2.7% 
            7.37 to 8.60 billion-------2.7% 
            7.36 to 7.37 billion-------5.4% 
 
Based on historical distributions, there is a 
67.5 percent probability that the 2007 crop 
will be between 11.06 billion and 13.52 
billion bushels, or within 10 percent of 
expected production.  There is an 18.9 
percent chance of a crop smaller than 11.06 
billion bushels, which would require 
substantial rationing of use, and a 13.5 
percent chance of a crop larger than 13.52 
billion bushels, which would likely lead to a 
build-up of inventories during the 2007-08 
marketing year.   
 
It could be argued that a conditional 
probability distribution for the difference 
between actual and expected production in 
2007 should be constructed based on 
information already known about 2007 yield 
potential.  That is, based on such factors as 
planting progress, weather conditions to 
date, and the National Weather Service 
forecast for general summer weather 
conditions, one might delete some historical 
observations on the difference between 
actual and expected production, arguing 
that the conditions that existed in those 
years have already been precluded from 
happening in 2007, and then recalculate the 
probability distribution.  We have chosen not 
to attempt to calculate such a conditional 
probability for two reasons.  First, not 
enough is yet known to completely defend 
the deletion of any historical observations.   
Second, there are only two years that might 
be strong candidates for elimination (1988 
and 1993).  Production in 1988 (drought) 
was 40.4 percent less than expected and 
production in 1993 (flood) was 33.2 percent   5
less than expected.  Deleting those two 
years would reduce the probability of 
production in 2007 falling more than 30 
percent below expected production from 8.1 
percent to 2.9 percent.  The probability is 
relatively small in both cases and the 
difference does not substantially influence 
the choice of production scenarios to 




There will be important consumption, price, 
and perhaps policy implications of the actual 
size of the 2007 U.S. corn crop.  Those 
implications may be very different for a crop 
near the expected level, a crop much 
smaller than expected, and a crop much 
larger than expected.  The implications of 
four possible scenarios are briefly examined 
here— a crop at the expected level (12.29 
billion bushels), a crop 10 percent larger 
than expected (13.519 billion bushels), a 
crop 10 percent smaller than expected 
(11.061 billion bushels), and a crop 20 
percent smaller than expected (9.832 billion 
bushels).   The range from 10 percent 
above expected production to 20 percent 
below expected production acknowledges 
the higher probability of a large negative 
difference in actual and expected production 
relative to the probability of a large positive 
difference in actual and expected production 
and covers about three-quarters of the 
historical distribution.  A scenario for a 
“bumper” crop that exceeds 10 percent of 
expected production is not developed, but 
the results of such a crop would include, 
lower prices, larger consumption, and larger 
year-ending stocks than projected under the 
scenario of a crop 10 percent larger than 
expected.  Similarly, a scenario for a 
“disaster” crop that is more than 20 percent 
below expected production is not 
developed, but the implications of such a 
crop are discussed.  For each production 
scenario, a 2007-08 marketing year balance 
sheet projecting supply, consumption by 
category, year-ending stocks, and 
marketing year average farm price is 
developed.  The rational for the 
consumption and price projections are 
presented along with a brief discussion of 
the possible implications for market 
participants and the possible policy 
implications, particularly the implications of 
a very small crop. 
 
CONSUMPTION AND PRICE 
IMPLICATIONS 
      
Potential supply and consumption balance 
sheets for the 2007-08 U.S. corn marketing 
year for each of the four production 
scenarios developed in the previous section 
– 12.29 billion bushels, 13.519 billion 
bushels, 11.061 billion bushels, and 9.832 
billion bushels are presented in Table 2.   
The consumption projections for the 
scenario reflecting expected crop size 
(12.29 billion bushels) are similar to the 
May, 11, 2007 projections by the USDA’s 
WAOB.   
  
A crop of 12.29 billion bushels would allow 
for a substantial increase in consumption of 
U.S. corn during the 2007-08 marketing 
year.  Based on the pace of construction of 
processing capacity, the USDA projects a 
1.25 billion bushel increase in corn used for 
ethanol production, to a total of 3.4 billion 
bushels.  Other processing uses would 
likely be near 1.4 billion bushels, reflecting a 
continuation of a very slow growth rate.   
Corn exports will likely decline from the 2.2 
billion bushels expected this year due to 
large competing supplies in South America.  
We project a 9 percent decline, to a total of 
2 billion bushels.  Feed and residual use of 
corn will also likely decline from the level of 
the current year as byproduct feed from the 
ethanol industry provides more competition.  
Byproduct feed from a 1.25 billion bushel 
increase in corn used for ethanol production 
would substitute for about 150 million 
bushels of corn feeding if 75 percent of the 
byproduct is used in the domestic market.  
Allowing for some modest increase in 
livestock numbers, a 100 million bushel 
decline in corn feeding is forecast, to a total 
of 5.75 billion bushels.  Total use might be 
near 12.55 billion bushels, 975 million more   6
than expected use for the current year, 
leaving year ending stocks at only 692 
million bushels, or 5.5 percent of expected 
use.  Under that scenario, the 2007-08 
marketing year average price of corn might 
be near $3.30.  The WAOB May 11 
forecasts were for consumption of 12.465 
billion bushels, year-ending stocks of 947 
million bushels, and a marketing year 
average price in a range of $3.10 to $3.70.  
At the close of trade on May 17, 2007 the 
futures market reflected an average farm 
price for the year ahead near $3.70. 
 
A crop 10 percent larger than expected 
would likely result in lower prices, increased 
consumption, and larger carryover stocks.   
We project larger use in each category 
except non-ethanol processing uses (Other) 
of corn.  A crop of 13.519 billion bushels 
could result in total consumption of 12.9 
billion bushels, year ending stocks of 1.566 
billion (12.1 percent of projected use) and a 
2007-08 marketing year average price near 
$2.60. 
 
A crop 10 percent smaller than expected, at 
11.061 billion bushels, would force 
consumption of corn for all purposes to be 
slightly less than during the current 
marketing year and one billion bushels less 
than projected with production at the 
expected level.  For this and the following 
analysis, we assume that the year-ending 
stocks-to-use ratio cannot be reduced below 
4 percent.  This assumption follows from the 
idea that the minimum carryover is the 
amount needed to keep the corn marketing 
“pipeline” full.  It is not known with certainty 
how large that need is, but in the most 
recent year of serious rationing of use 
(1995-96), stocks were reduced to 5 percent 
of consumption.  Assuming that year-ending 
stocks cannot be reduced below 4 percent 
of consumption, use would be limited to 
11.55 billion bushels and year ending stocks 
reduced to 463 million bushels.  Prices 
would have to be high enough to ration use 
of the crop.  Use of corn by category would 
be determined by the price elasticity of 
demand in each category.  It is likely that 
the demand for ethanol, as well as other 
processing uses of corn, is relatively price 
inelastic and that the demand for corn as 
livestock feed is relatively price elastic.   
That is, as prices increase, consumption of 
corn for processing uses would likely 
decline by a smaller percentage than feed 
use of corn.  Profit margins would be 
reduced or eliminated in the feed sector at 
lower corn prices than in the processing 
sector.  The magnitude of the price elasticity 
of export demand is probably between the 
value for the other two categories, but 
closer to the elasticity of feed demand than 
processing demand since most corn is 
exported for livestock feed.  Use of 11.55 
billion bushels would be about 8 percent 
less than use under the scenario with 
expected production.  The estimates by 
category in the balance sheet reflect the 
following percentage reductions: 
 
Feed-------down 11.5 percent
Exports----down 10 percent 
Ethanol----down   3 percent 
Other-------down  3 percent 
  
While these projections by category reflect 
the general pattern expected, actual use by 
category could deviate substantially from 
these projections.  The important point is 
that total consumption would be restricted to 
a total of only about 11.55 billion bushels.   
 
Corn prices would have to go to levels high 
enough to restrict consumption to the level 
of available supplies.  A period of very high 
prices, probably exceeding the high 
experienced in the spring of 1996, would 
likely occur in order to accomplish the 
necessary rationing and the average farm 
price would likely exceed $4.00.  There are 
no historical observations on which to base 
the average price forecast, but an average 
near $4.25 is projected. 
 
A crop 20 percent smaller than expected 
would magnify the need for rationing 
outlined under the previous scenario.  A 
crop of 9.832 billion bushels and year 
ending stocks of 414 million (4 percent of   7
use) would allow consumption of only 10.37 
billion bushels, 17.4 percent (2.18 billion 
bushels) less than consumption with a crop 
of 12.29 billion bushels.  Compared to the 
scenario of expected production, use by 
category is forecast to decline as follows: 
 
Feed-------down 22.6 percent
Exports—down 20 percent 
Ethanol---down 10 percent 
Other -----down 10 percent 
 
As in the previous scenario, consumption by 
category could deviate substantially from 
these projections, but total consumption 
would be limited by available supplies.  A 
period of extremely high prices would be 
required in order to force such a large 
reduction in use.  To reduce corn use for 
ethanol production, for example, corn prices 
would have to be high enough so that the 
most inefficient plants were unable to 
recoup variable costs of ethanol production.  
With ethanol prices near $2.20 per gallon, 
that price could be near $6.00.  The 
average farm price for the year would likely 
exceed $5.00 per bushel and is forecast at 
$5.25.  The high prices would force a 
substantial reduction in livestock numbers, 
increasing meat supplies in the short run, 
but resulting in much smaller supplies after 
that.  Meat production could eventually 
decline 10 to 15 percent, resulting in 
escalating retail meat prices.  The high 
prices would have significant negative 
financial implications for livestock 
producers, forcing some to discontinue 
production entirely. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKET 
PARTICIPANTS AND POLICY MAKERS 
  
The historical distribution of the difference 
between actual U.S. corn production and 
production expected in the spring of the 
year suggests that there is an 80 percent 
probability that the 2007 crop will be 
between 10 percent smaller than expected 
(11.061 billion bushels) and 16.7 percent 
larger than expected (14.466 billion 
bushels).  Production in this range would 
likely have few, if any, policy implications.   
While a crop smaller than the expected crop 
of 12.29 billion bushels would require use to 
be less than projected, a production shortfall 
of 10 percent or less would likely be 
managed by price signals, requiring no 
policy intervention.  Market participants 
would have to manage higher corn prices.  
Larger shortfalls in production, however, 
might be more problematic due to: 1) the 
very small level of old crop stocks that will 
be on hand at the beginning of the 2007-08 
marketing year, and 2) the very robust 
demand for corn expected from the ethanol 
sector.  The historical pattern of the 
difference between actual and expected 
production suggests that the odds of a 
shortfall of 10 percent or more is not trivial.  
Shortfalls exceeding 10 percent occurred, 
on average, about once in five years since 
1970.  Shortfalls exceeding 20 percent of 
expected production would require 
significant rationing and very high prices, 
with potentially very negative implications 
for some users of corn.  Shortfalls of that 
magnitude have occurred, on average, 
about once in 12 years since 1970. 
 
An important public policy question, then, is, 
with an extreme shortfall in production, 
would the market be allowed to allocate the 
crop among users or would such a shortfall 
in corn production induce government 
intervention?  The norm from past 
experience with rationing has been to allow 
the market to allocate the crop, with the 
largest adjustments taking place in the 
livestock sector.  However, there has been 
one exception.  Short supplies and high 
soybean prices in 1973 resulted in an 
embargo on U.S. exports.  Such an 
embargo on corn exports might be 
considered following a large shortfall in 
production, but the potential negative impact 
on longer-term trade relationships would 
make an embargo a very unpopular 
alternative.  The financial implications of 
high corn prices for livestock producers 
might evoke intervention in the allocation of 
supplies between domestic livestock 
producers and processors of corn.     8
At this stage of the 2007 growing season, 
there is certainly no indication of a 
substantial shortfall in U.S. corn production, 
nor are we predicting such an outcome.   
Discussion of market and policy implications 
of such a shortfall, then, may appear to be 
premature, unrealistic, or even alarmist.  It 
is important to recognize, however, that the 
worst-case scenarios for corn production in 
2007 (shortfalls exceeding 20 percent) were 
not analyzed.  History indicates that 
shortfalls in production as large as 30 or 40 
percent, though unlikely, are possible.  The 
focus of the analysis here is not to forecast 
crop size, but to draw attention to the 
implications of crop size.  Market 
participants and policy makers should be 
particularly aware of the consequences of a 
large shortfall in 2007 corn production.   
Market participants can develop plans to 
manage a shortfall in production and policy 
makers can consider appropriate responses 
to a significant shortfall.  Developing policy 
responses in advance of the problem would 
allow input from market participants, provide 
for fair and reasoned policies, and allow for 
smoother implementation of the policies if 
needed.  Even if a shortfall is avoided in 
2007, the risk will continue for at least the 
next couple of years given the current low 
level of inventories, the current incentives 
for expansion of ethanol production, the lack 
of alternative feed stocks for ethanol 
production, and the need to continue to 
increase U.S corn acreage.  
 
The current situation in the corn market may 
have other policy implications.  Corn prices 
are expected to remain generally high and 
extremely volatile for an extended period of 
time.  The combination of a low level of 
stocks and an increasing portion of corn 
consumption occurring in the ethanol sector, 
where demand is relatively price insensitive, 
suggests that prices will be extremely 
responsive to small changes in U.S. and 
world production prospects or changes in 
demand for corn in any other sector.  Prices 
of other commodities will also be influenced 
as the market attempts to allocate 
production resources, primarily land, among 
the various crops.  Provisions of the new 
“farm bill” are expected to reflect this 
changing environment of high and volatile 
crop prices.  In addition, careful 
consideration of potential market impact 
should be given to policies encouraging 
additional bio-fuels production.  Other 
considerations might include provision for a 
corn reserve in years of large production to 







































Table 1. Percentage Difference Between Actual U.S. 
Corn Production and Expected Production in the 
Spring, 1970-71 through 2006-07 Marketing Years
 92006-07 2007-08: 2007-08: 2007-08: 2007-08:
USDA Expected 10% Larger 10% Smaller 20% Smaller
WASDE Production Production Production Production
Supply (million bushels)
Beginning Stocks 1,967 937 937 937 937
Imports 10 15 10 15 15
Production 10,535 12,290 13,519 11,061 9,832
TOTAL 12,512 13,242 14,466 12,013 10,784
Consumption (million bushels)
Feed and Residual 5,850 5,750 5,850 5,090 4,450
Exports 2,200 2,000 2,150 1,800 1,600
Ethanol 2,150 3,400 3,500 3,300 3,060
Other 1,375 1,400 1,400 1,360 1,260
TOTAL 11,575 12,550 12,900 11,550 10,370
Ending Stocks 937 692 1,566 463 414
Ending Stocks/Use 8.1% 5.5% 12.1% 4.0% 4.0%
Average  Farm  Price $3.10  $3.30 $2.60 $4.25 $5.25 
Table 2. Potential Supply and Consumption Balance Sheets for the 2007-08 U.S. Corn Marketing Year 
Note: USDA WASDE estimates for 2006-07 were released on May 11, 2007.
Figure 1. Percentage Difference Between Actual U.S. Corn Production and 







































 10Figure 2. Frequency Distribution of the Percentage Difference Between Actual 
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Figure 3. Percentage Difference Between Actual U.S. Corn Production/Yield and 





































 11March June  Harvested Not Harvested Actual Actual Planted Acreage Not Acreage
Year Intentions Estimate Actual for Grain for Grain Yield Production Acreage Harvested for Grain Harvested for Grain Yield Production Billion Bushels %
1960/61 81.425    71,422        10.003                54.7 3.907           
1961/62 65.919    57,634        8.285                  62.4 3.598           
1962/63 65.017    55,726        9.291                  64.7 3.606           
1963/64 68.771    59,227        9.544                  67.9 4.019           
1964/65 65.823    55,369        10.454                62.9 3.484           
1965/66 65.171    55,392        9.779                  74.1 4.103           
1966/67 66.347    57,002        9.345                  73.1 4.168           
1967/68 71.156    60,694        10.462                80.1 4.860           
1968/69 65.126    55,980        9.146                  79.5 4.450           
1969/70 64.264    54,574        9.690                  85.9 4.687           
1970/71 66.662        67.352      66.863    57,358        9.505                  72.4 4.152            66.662     9.684                            56.978                          87.3 4.976            -0.824 -19.9
1971/72 71.480        74.651      74.179    64,123        10.056                88.1 5.646            71.480     9.630                            61.850                          85.0 5.255            0.391 6.9
1972/73 68.460        66.846      67.126    57,513        9.613                  97.0 5.580            68.460     9.772                            58.688                          88.4 5.187            0.393 7.0
1973/74 71.571        72.452      72.253    62,143        10.110                91.3 5.671            71.571     9.602                            61.969                          93.5 5.796            -0.125 -2.2
1974/75 78.803        77.743      77.935    65,405        12.530                71.9 4.701            78.803     9.795                            69.008                          95.7 6.603            -1.902 -40.5
1975/76 75.290        77.527      78.719    67,625        11.094                86.4 5.841            75.290     10.363                          64.927                          92.1 5.977            -0.136 -2.3
1976/77 82.727        84.092      84.588    71,506        13.082                88.0 6.289            82.727     10.681                          72.046                          92.8 6.683            -0.394 -6.3
1977/78 83.923        82.735      84.328    71,614        12.714                90.8 6.505            83.923     11.286                          72.637                          93.6 6.802            -0.297 -4.6
1978/79 80.237        78.717      81.675    71,930        9.745                  101.0 7.268            80.237     11.906                          68.331                          94.9 6.486            0.782 10.8
1979/80 79.209        79.751      81.394    72,400        8.994                  109.5 7.928            79.209     11.833                          67.376                          98.1 6.606            1.322 16.7
1980/81 82.022        83.478      84.043    72,961        11.082                91.0 6.639            82.022     11.126                          70.896                          102.3 7.252            -0.613 -9.2
1981/82 83.977        84.677      84.097    74,524        9.573                  108.9 8.119            83.977     11.123                          72.854                          102.3 7.450            0.669 8.2
1982/83 84.735        82.129      81.857    72,719        9.138                  113.2 8.235            84.735     10.422                          74.313                          105.4 7.835            0.400 4.9
1983/84 58.812        60.129      60.207    51,479        8.728                  81.1 4.174            58.812     9.706                            49.106                          108.8 5.344            -1.170 -28.0
1984/85 81.766        79.940      80.517    71,897        8.620                  106.7 7.672            81.766     9.503                            72.263                          106.3 7.685            -0.013 -0.2
1985/86 82.021        83.217      83.398    75,209        8.189                  118.0 8.875            82.021     9.428                            72.593                          108.3 7.858            1.017 11.5
1986/87 78.066        76.646      76.580    68,907        7.673                  119.4 8.226            78.066     8.850                            69.216                          111.6 7.725            0.501 6.1
1987/88 67.556        66.024      66.200    59,505        6.695                  119.8 7.131            67.556     8.470                            59.086                          114.7 6.778            0.353 5.0
1988/89 66.926        67.519      67.717    58,250        9.467                  84.6 4.929            66.926     7.981                            58.945                          117.4 6.922            -1.993 -40.4
1989/90 73.253        72.790      72.322    64,783        7.539                  116.3 7.532            73.253     8.129                            65.124                          114.9 7.486            0.046 0.6
1990/91 74.804        74.574      74.166    66,952        7.214                  118.5 7.934            74.804     7.913                            66.891                          116.9 7.822            0.112 1.4
1991/92 76.124        75.909      75.957    68,822        7.135                  108.6 7.475            76.124     7.718                            68.406                          119.0 8.138            -0.663 -8.9
1992/93 79.007        79.335      79.311    72,077        7.234                  131.5 9.477            79.007     7.610                            71.397                          119.5 8.532            0.945 10.0
1993/94 76.486        74.259      73.239    62,933        10.306                100.7 6.338            76.486     7.718                            68.768                          122.7 8.440            -2.102 -33.2
1994/95 78.625        78.767      78.921    72,514        6.407                  138.6 10.051          78.625     7.886                            70.739                          122.0 8.628            1.423 14.2
1995/96 75.323        72.800      71.479    65,210        6.269                  113.5 7.400            75.323     7.659                            67.664                          125.6 8.499            -1.099 -14.8
1996/97 79.920        80.355      79.229    72,644        6.585                  127.1 9.233            79.920     7.470                            72.450                          126.1 9.133            0.100 1.1
1997/98 81.416        80.227      79.537    72,671        6.866                  126.7 9.207            81.416     7.360                            74.056                          127.9 9.474            -0.267 -2.9
1998/99 80.781        80.798      80.165    72,589        7.576                  134.4 9.759            80.781     7.287                            73.494                          129.6 9.521            0.238 2.4
1999/00 78.219        77.611      77.386    70,487        6.899                  133.8 9.431            78.219     6.741                            71.478                          131.8 9.421            0.010 0.1
2000/01 77.881        79.579      79.551    72,440        7.111                  136.9 9.915            77.881     6.839                            71.042                          133.8 9.503            0.412 4.2
2001/02 76.693        76.109      75.702    68,768        6.934                  138.2 9.503            76.693     7.007                            69.686                          135.9 9.467            0.036 0.4
2002/03 79.047        78.847      78.894    69,330        9.564                  129.3 8.968            79.047     7.077                            71.970                          137.9 9.922            -0.954 -10.6
2003/04 79.022        79.066      78.603    70,944        7.659                  142.2 10.089          79.022     7.617                            71.405                          138.9 9.915            0.174 1.7
2004/05 79.004        80.968      80.929    73,631        7.298                  160.4 11.807          79.004     7.633                            71.371                          140.9 10.058          1.749 14.8
2005/06 81.413        81.592      81.779    75,117        6.662                  148.0 11.114          81.413     7.713                            73.700                          144.4 10.645          0.469 4.2
2006/07 78.019        79.366      78.327    70,648        7.679                  149.100 10.535          78.019     7.623                            70.396                          146.6 10.319          0.216 2.1
2007/08 90,454          90.454     7.772                            82.682                          148.6 12.290         
Note: Acreage is reported as million acres, yield as bushels per acre, and production as billion bushels
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